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Radio stations tend to repeat existing formats, inhibiting diversity of musical 
broadcasting.  Musical format homogeneity is problematic, because music conveys 
knowledge and ideas; therefore, an absence of musical diversity among radio stations 
indicates limits on knowledge dissemination.  I contend that concentration of ownership 
contributes to the pattern of format redundancy in the radio industry; therefore, my 
research question is what causes format homogeneity in the radio industry? I tested two 
hypotheses.  My first hypothesis is that both radio industry ownership concentration and 
format homogeneity are higher after 1996 (when telecommunications regulation 
changed) than from 1994-1996.  My second hypothesis is that as ownership concentration 
increases, format homogeneity will also increase, regardless of year.  I coded and 
analyzed data from The Gale Directory of Publications and Broadcast Media.  I utilized 
means comparisons and ordinary least squares regression to test my hypotheses, finding a 
positive and strong relationship between ownership concentration and format 
homogeneity.  My research confirms the danger of loosely regulated radio station 
ownership for promoting a pluralistic American society.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Literature, art and music all convey beliefs, values and ideas about society.  Some 
ideas support the social status quo, while some ideas subvert it.  Music is a powerful 
means of conveying ideas.  For example, ideas in music can be so powerful that music 
gets subjected to public condemnation, such as when the Parents’ Music Resource 
Council’s movement initiated the music industry’s “parental advisory” notification on 
recording projects deemed “objectionable.”   
Most music is heard via radio broadcasting, and radio station owners often 
determine their station’s musical content.  Radio station proprietors might possibly regard 
reactions such as parental advisories as a rationale for prohibiting innovative music 
broadcast, since musical diversity reflects alternative ways of thinking.  Musical 
expression is influential, considering how controversial it can be.   
In this sense, then, station owners may exercise disproportionate control over 
ideas.  Currently, many radio station owners possess multiple stations and present a 
viewpoint of privilege through redundant formatting.  Other viewpoints often are 
unrepresented in the radio industry, because station owners, by repeating one type of 
formatting, exclude others.  Hence, ownership concentration would be expected to have 
an impact on format homogeneity in the radio industry.
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Ownership concentration occurs when a few proprietors own most of the entities 
or companies in an economic industry (Croteau & Hoynes, 2000).  Ownership 
concentration in the radio industry seems to derive from relaxed ownership regulation.  
Radio airwaves are the exclusive property of the state; therefore, the federal government 
regulates many aspects of the radio industry, including station ownership.  Radio station 
ownership requirements are equally applicable to solitary proprietors or corporations.   
The federal government began regulating radio station ownership in 1941.  At that 
time, a single owner could possess no more than two radio stations in a local economic 
market; regulations after 1941 allowed an owner to possess as many as five.  However, 
the 1996 Telecommunications Act increased ownership concentration even more: one 
proprietor can own as many as eight stations in a market of 45 or more stations; a sole 
proprietor can own seven stations in a market of 30 to 44 radio facilities; and a single 
owner can possess six stations in a market where 15 to 29 radio stations operate (FCC, 
2003).  Revisions to the act in 2001 and 2002 expanded ownership concentration by 
permitting a sole proprietor to possess radio stations on frequency modulation (FM) and 
analog modulation (AM) in the same market.   
Government deregulation appears to facilitate corporate acquisition of existing 
independent radio stations in local markets.  For example, Clear Channel purchased 
numerous local radio stations in several local markets across the United States.  In the 
North Carolina “Triad” market cities of Greensboro, High Point and Winston Salem, 
Clear Channel owned one out of every five radio stations in 2001.  Collectively, Clear 
Channel, Entercom Broadcasting and Truth Broadcasting owned over half (sixteen) of the 
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market’s twenty-eight radio stations (Radio & Records, 2003).  Because of their ability to 
purchase independent competition, corporations can dominate local markets.   
Ownership concentration encourages product homogeneity because of reduced 
competition among radio providers.  When there’s competition, radio station owners seek 
a niche audience, a small core of listeners of an esoteric genre of music (such as jazz or 
classical).  Because of their loyalty, niche audiences are a profitable market for radio 
stations and owners willing to cater to a niche’s musical proclivities.  Radio ownership 
concentration, however, makes niche formatting superfluous.  The general market is 
adequate in size to profit from redundant formatting when there is a lack of competition.  
For example, in 2001 the Triad radio stations broadcast only eight distinctive formats out 
of the more than fifty musical formats recognized by Arbitron, the industry’s ratings 
organizer (Arbitron, 2003).  Because similar patterns exist in other markets, ownership 
concentration may impact local radio station’s product, the musical format.   
Hence, my general research question concerns the cause(s) of format 
homogeneity in the radio industry.  Because I understand ownership concentration might 
possibly affect format homogeneity, my first hypothesis is that both radio industry 
ownership concentration and format homogeneity will be higher after 1996 than from 
1994 through 1996.  My second hypothesis is that as ownership concentration increases, 
format homogeneity will also increase, regardless of year.  The hypothesized relationship 
between ownership concentration and radio formatting forms the basis of my thesis.  
Because airwaves are considered to be owned by the state, deregulation is an important 
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factor for ownership concentration.  The most significant legislation for the radio industry 
occurred with the 1996 Telecommunications Act. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Radio is a public domain.  The 1927 Radio Act designated radio airwaves as state 
property; operating a radio station was deemed to be a public undertaking that required 
governmental regulation.  Current laws governing the radio industry, however, reflect a 
different view about radio station proprietorship.   
The 1996 Telecommunications Act: From Media Trusteeship  
To Media Marketplace 
The economic model has replaced the trusteeship model in regulation 
development.  By comparing previous regulations with the 1996 Telecommunications 
Act, Bednarski (2003) analyzes the language of prior rules and compares the 1996 act 
against other laws to glean a rationale alteration in the 1996 legislation.  According to the 
researcher, 1927 and 1934 radio acts represented the “trusteeship model” philosophy to 
industry regulation.  For example, the 1927 law bestowed upon Congress the authority to 
regulate radio through license allocations, determining operation hours and making 
frequency decisions.  The regulations considered radio station ownership as in the “public 
convenience, interest, or necessity,” as well as a “privilege” (p 275).  In addition, the 
1934 Communications Act established the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
as a sole governmental oversight agency of the radio industry.  The 1934 act also 
restricted ownership concentration by limiting license transfers between owners.  
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Of course, the 1941 Radio Act set caps on the number of radio stations a single entity 
could possess.   
By comparison, the 1996 Telecommunications Act presents the “marketplace 
model” of regulatory behavior by deregulating radio station ownership to the extent that 
single entities (either an individual or a corporation) can be proprietors over a number of 
radio stations on a national scale; this was done by increasing the cap limits and allowing 
ownership across frequencies in a single market.  Program redundancy is now allowable 
in the radio industry.  Radio station owners are able to repeat popular formats in the same 
market if it allows the owner to compete with other stations.  Bednarski argues that the 
diversity portion of the 1996 act ignores the diversity of ideas rules from previous 
regulations.  In this model, the market determines regulations.  The philosophical 
transition from privilege based ownership and format choices to market determinism and 
format redundancy provides a legal basis for ownership concentration and format 
homogeneity in the industry.  Softer rules that embody the shift in ownership alter the 
entire industry.          
In markets where there are more radio stations there tend to be more program 
formats.  Steiner (1952) sought to confirm a hypothesis that more radio stations in a 
market increases the market’s musical format diversity.  Steiner utilized theoretical 
formulas that considered profitability, program format number of radio stations and 
format duplication as variables.  One formula represents the calculation of the impact of 
number radio stations on the number of musical formats offered.  Steiner implemented 
the previously mentioned formula across a hypothetical five-year period to assess 
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audience programming preferences based on the number of radio stations in a market, 
assuming that each station provided a different format.  The results showed that the 
number of radio stations in a local market increases format diversity by illustrating that 
audiences have varied preferences in any market.  The prior analysis presents the effects 
of ownership concentration on product variety in the radio industry; policy affects both 
characteristics.   
The 1996 Telecommunications Act generated greater ownership concentration 
and undermined diversity.  Drushel’s (1998) secondary analysis of the 50 largest radio 
markets in the United States documented an increase in ownership concentration from 
1992 to 1997.  The results were generalizable; therefore, an increase in ownership 
concentration probably happened in the population of all commercial radio stations in the 
United States.  However, Drushel lacked support for his hypothesis that ownership 
concentration from the 1996 Telecommunications Act created format diversity.   
Even qualitative research confirms how station ownership affects broadcasting. 
Ahlkvist and Faulkner’s (2002) qualitative analysis of interviews with 32 radio station 
program directors explored how music formats in commercial radio are managed.  They 
found that group owned radio stations repeat existing formats, while independently 
owned radio stations transmit more unique formats.  Independently owned radio stations 
formats are determined by the directors’ musical tastes, because independent radio station 
programmers want their radio stations to educate their audiences.  Conversely, formatting 
at group owned stations is determined by demographic information compiled by the 
corporate office.  Radio station programmers that are components of a large 
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conglomerate believe that radio stations exist to make a profit.  Programming is 
approached from an economic marketplace model that emphasizes generating the greatest 
revenue for the station.  The result is often duplication of existing profitable formats.  
Since group owned radio is becoming prominent, radio stations sound more and more 
similar. 
Only one research example suggested that ownership concentration increases 
format variety.  Berry and Waldfogel (2001) discovered a positive association between 
ownership concentration and radio format heterogeneity that was also expected in the 
population from which their sample was drawn.  Berry and Waldfogel found that 
concentration increased, but so did format variety.  One reason for this unusual result 
may be their willingness to categorize hybrid formats, i.e., the combination of two 
existing formats, as a unique format.   
Most other research reached a contradictory result.  Rogers and Woodbury (1996) 
hypothesized that more radio stations in a market increases the number of musical 
formats.  The researchers analyzed musical formats, ownership total and audience ratings 
of 115 markets from 1977 to1987.  Their data derived from industry sources: Arbitron 
ratings results and Broadcast Publication, Inc.  The results support the researchers’ main 
hypothesis: radio station totals influence format diversity in local markets.  The 
researchers conducted ordinary least squares tests to determine that an increased number 
of radio stations increased format diversity.  The researchers inferred that more radio 
station proprietors generate greater format variety.   
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An absence of ownership diversity drives format homogeneity.  Greve’s (1996) 
research specifically analyzed radio stations that adopted adult contemporary formats 
from 1984 through 1993.1  Greve found that corporate ownership determined adoption of 
adult contemporary programming by radio stations.  This association probably held true  
for all commercial radio stations in the United States.  Greve’s analysis inferred that 
ownership concentration creates format homogeneity.  
Format homogeneity is becoming normalized in the radio industry.  Wirth (2002) 
discovered that among 152 markets from 1995 to 2000, the amount of direct competition 
(i.e., radio stations broadcasting identical formats) increased by 11%.  Ownership 
concentration is a possible reason for the format duplication because Wirth’s study was 
conducted during proprietorship deregulation.  Wirth considered direct competition to be 
a form of diversity.  Ownership concentration may increase format homogeneity, in that 
format copying is normal, fiscally prudent and present wherever owners in local markets 
are fewer. 
Concentrated ownership and format homogeneity are effective cost cutting 
practices.  Eklund, Ford and Koutsky (2000) contended that ownership concentration in 
the radio industry is an efficient undertaking.  Ownership concentration reduces operating 
costs by allowing multiple radio stations to share staff and programming, resulting in 
repeated formats. Analyzing all radio station procurements from 1995 and 1996, the 
researchers found a relationship between ownership concentration and efficiency.  
                                                 
 
1 The researcher chose adult contemporary because the programming was popular at the beginning of the 
study. 
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Eklund, Ford & Koutsky discovered a relationship between ownership concentration and 
efficiency that probably exists in the population.  Concentration of ownership may utilize 
format homogeneity to reduce expenditures.  Their research identified corporate interests 
as the philosophical foundation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act.   
The 1996 Telecommunications Act promotes a corporate state.  Hunterman 
(1999) identified conglomerate concerns in deregulation efforts.  The initial regulation, 
The 1927 Radio Act, established radio airwaves as public property, subjecting radio to 
the trusteeship model of ownership.  The deregulation from the 1996 
Telecommunications Act expanded ownership in markets and eliminated ownership 
restrictions on national radio organizations, which promoted corporate interests.  Only 
one year after the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the number of radio station owners 
declined by 11.7% and the number of minority-owned stations decreased from 350 
(3.1%) to 322 (2.8%).  Because minority-owned radio stations cater to minority tastes in 
their programming, losing minority owned stations by corporate purchase reduces format 
diversity as new owners compete for listeners with more disposable income.  The reduced 
number of radio station owners is assisted by statute.     
Current laws encourage ownership consolidation in the radio industry.  In this 
case, the radio industry’s ownership concentration is due to antitrust laws (merger 
regulations) that allow industry consolidation (Leeper, 2000).  For decades, antitrust laws 
espoused the trusteeship model to radio station ownership; however, recent antitrust 
legislation reflects a model that condones massive consolidation.  Leeper examined the 
1996 Telecommunications Act in specifically conveying this point.  Because the antitrust 
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torts represent an economic view of ownership, Leeper argued that this philosophy 
ignores diversity in radio station formats; thus, antitrust laws also favor format 
homogeneity.  Current laws encourage ownership consolidation in the radio industry.  
The capricious regulatory philosophy provides the impetus for a “manifest destiny” 
approach to radio station ownership, i.e., a few owners expanding their market share 
through procurement of existing radio stations, diminishing program variety as a normal 
aspect of business.    
Consolidation of radio markets hampers radio programming diversity.  Chambers 
(2003a) discovered that market structure reduces format diversity.  He found a 
moderately negative relationship between ownership concentration and format diversity; 
as ownership concentration increases throughout radio markets, format diversity 
decreases.  Ownership concentration promotes format redundancy.  Chambers found 
three fewer formats in the high concentration markets in his sample than in the less 
concentrated markets.  His findings were statistically significant and thus, generalizable: 
a relationship between market structure and radio programming diversity probably exists 
in the population of American radio markets.  In reference to Berry and Waldfogel’s 
(2001) research, which found a positive link between ownership concentration and format 
heterogeneity, Chambers thought the impact of the 1996 Telecommunications Act was 
possibly undetected by the observation period of their study, which does not assess the 
prolonged effects of deregulation on ownership concentration. 
Deregulation eschews ownership and content diversity in the radio industry.  
Prindle (2003) states that the 1996 Telecommunications Act harms diversity through the 
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marketplace model that the legislation advocates, which is similar to Bednarski’s (2003) 
contention.  He argues that deregulation has generated ownership concentration, which 
instigated program redundancy throughout radio.  Prindle’s belief is that the paradigm 
shift from a trusteeship perspective to a marketplace model of ownership has led to an 
industry taking advantage in lax rules by seeking ownership concentration and content 
redundancy because both are profitable, a value that is highly encouraged under the 
current deregulatory marketplace model.  In the end, according to Prindle, an open 
ownership structure and diversity are absent in radio because of the marketplace model, 
which emphasizes industry consolidation.   
Procurements and mergers have developed ownership concentration in radio 
through deregulation.  Based on Chang and Ki’s (2004) analysis of all mergers and 
acquisitions by United States radio companies from 1981 to 2002, mergers and 
procurements occurred most during deregulation episodes.  Increases in merger and 
procurement activity occurred in 1984, 1988, 1993 and 1996, the years immediately after 
deregulation periods identified by the researchers.  Merger activity was strongly 
associated with year (Pearson’s correlation coefficient =.93).  Chang and Ki’s research 
quantitatively demonstrates the effects of deregulation policy from the 1996 
Telecommunications Act.  The procurement and merger activity that allows ownership 
concentration affects the radio industry product.    
Deregulation in the radio industry inhibits programming specifically targeted to 
local communities.  According to Chambers’(2003b) study of small markets from 1972 
through 1998, the ownership concentration that occurred after the 1996 
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Telecommunications Act has negatively affected format variety in small markets.  Large 
conglomerates often replace independent owners after industry deregulation, affecting the 
program choices of audiences because independent owners are often interested in local 
programming (such as community affairs broadcasts that reflect radio’s diverse 
programming), while corporate owners utilize syndicated national programming that 
ignore community interests where radio stations are located.  The conventional wisdom 
of regulation, especially in small markets, is that more local voices indicate diversity.   
Deregulation ignores local community tastes.  The concomitant ownership 
concentration after deregulation encourages program redundancy by utilizing syndicated 
broadcasts.  Copps (2003) argued that such a practice lacks consideration of public 
interest concerns about past standards with format redundancy.  Copps asserts that the 
1996 Telecommunications Act reflected the change from trusteeship ownership 
regulation to the marketplace model, which advocates industry consolidation through the 
legislation.   
Ownership concentration generates format decisions that override local voices, 
because local radio then relies on the corporate offices to determine formats 
Rothenbuhler (1985) spent several months as a participant-observer in Georgia at a local 
radio station, a subsidiary member of a large radio conglomerate.  He observed that 
station decisions about format and daily play-lists occurred through a hierarchy, initiated 
from the corporate headquarters located in the Northeastern United States.  Then 
Rothenbuhler found that local radio stations utilized corporate references (e.g., a program 
consultant) and national publications more than local advertising and audience requests in 
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determining musical formats at the radio station.  This research suggests that variety, 
when measured by the amount of local programming, suffers as the result of 
consolidation.  Often, local tastes are esoteric regarding musical genres.     
A 1974 ruling allowed radio stations to obviate niche formats that meet the best 
interest threshold for ones that generate greater station revenue, according to Glasser 
(1984).  The FCC allowed radio owners to eliminate formats that were deemed 
economically unsuccessful, thus solidifying the duplicate formats practiced in the radio 
industry.  For Glasser, the FCC’s decision did not assess the impact of niche stations 
regarding the best interest standard.  Glasser contended that commercial radio’s heavy 
dependence upon advertising makes advertisers the ‘consumers,’ while the industry’s 
‘product’ is developing an audience for listening to commercials, not music.  Competition 
does not occur under those circumstances, therefore, discouraging program diversity.  
Such practices often occur in free market economic systems.   
Ownership concentration in Sweden and Canada occurred after industry 
privatization and led to the industry ignoring preferences of local audiences.  Wallis and 
Malm (1993) conducted a historical analysis of Sweden’s radio industry to show how 
radio ownership concentrated after privatization.  Sweden’s government controlled its 
radio industry from the beginning; however, the 1981"Radio Neighborhood Law" 
allowed private radio operation by citizens.  A small number of corporations profited 
from the deregulation by establishing privately owned radio station chains through 
Sweden’s Program 3.  Privatization of the radio industry reduced public affairs 
programming in favor of more music driven programming, especially Western music.  
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Ownership concentrated within a decade of the legislation, and by then a few 
corporations dominated Sweden′s radio industry.  Privately owned stations broadcasted 
699 hours per week of programming in 1981, but 5700 hours were broadcast per week in 
1991.  Competition from state controlled radio decreased.  From 1981 to 1984, as the 
industry converted to a private concentrated ownership structure, popular music increased 
on these Swedish radio stations.  For instance, in 1981, 26% of Swedish radio 
programming was Western popular music, but by 1984 it increased to 33%.  Meanwhile, 
rock broadcasting decreased from 16% in 1981 to 12% by 1984. 2  Format preference 
correlates with the programming hours data, suggesting that the increase in popular music 
was associated with the ownership concentration that accompanied privatization.  Wallis 
and Malm implied that ownership concentration accompanied increased corporate 
presence in the radio industry. 
Canadian radio formerly operated under state control.  Private radio stations 
lobbied the Canadian government to gain industry access in the 1980’s.  Breland’s (1990) 
analysis of Bureau of Broadcasting data indicated that ownership concentration 
dominated Canada’s radio industry after privatization.  The privatization in Canada 
decreased public affairs and local programming in Canada in favor of a narrow selection 
of music formats.  This decrease in diversity, indicated by the elimination of public 
affairs programming after a change from state control to privatization, is similar to what 
Wallis and Malm (1993) discovered in Sweden, and the reduction in public affairs or 
community programming is similar to Chambers’ (2003b) and Copps’s (2003) analyses 
                                                 
2 Rock music is an indication of diversity because indigenous performers played rock; thus, rock broadcasts 
catered to a niche market of Swedish society, especially considering rock’s numerous subcategories.   
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of the United States radio industry.  Canada’s privatization efforts show that ownership 
concentration ignores audience distinctions.  Other industries are not immune to the 
effects of ownership concentration on product variety.   
The Television Industry 
Acquisition and mergers establish a concentrated ownership structure which 
affects television program diversity, according to Bielby and Bielby (2003).  Their 
research findings were similar to Chambers’s (2003a).  The researchers analyzed the 
effects of ownership concentration on programming by studying proposed shows from 
independent producers and the four large commercial networks (NBC, ABC, CBS and 
FOX) between 1990 and 2002.  Results showed that the backdrop of television industry 
deregulation, which began in 1985, influenced programming choices.  After deregulation, 
the major networks relied on self-produced programming, appearing less willing to 
provide diverse programming; by 2002 the networks owned 70% of the shows on 
television.  Situation comedies and dramas became the dominant programming genres of 
network television.  Such program redundancy may distort views on important social 
issues.   
Ownership structure in the television industry influences public opinion.  
Busterna’s (1988) regression analysis of ownership type and public opinion among 
commercial television stations showed that markets where group owners outnumbered 
independent owners have less diversity among public opinions. This research supports 
my own theoretical premise that ownership concentration is a means by which ideas are 
16
 
socially controlled.  Conversely, a diverse ownership structure encourages program 
variety.   
Proprietorship diversity in local television markets creates more heterogeneous 
programming.  By comparing concentrated and competitive ownership structures, 
Beebe’s (1977) research assumed that audiences would rank their preferred programs, if 
provided with enough choices.  Beebe utilized computer software to generate television 
markets from hypothetical viewer data.  Based on his model, a competitive ownership 
structure yields greater program diversity and audiences will take advantage of such 
diversity with an ordinal preference scheme; on the other hand, a concentrated ownership 
structure produces program homogeneity and undermines preference.  Diverse 
programming is unnecessary because a few owners control the market.  Audiences either 
accept narrow programming or discontinue viewing television, which may be the 
operating principle in other industries with a similar ownership structure.   
The Recording Industry 
The record industry’s ownership concentration also generates a redundant 
product.  Anderson, Hesbacher, Etzkorn and Denisoff (1980) compared concentrated and 
diverse ownership structures in the record industry.  The researchers analyzed data from 
the Billboard Top 100 List, examining all records achieving number one ranking from 
1940 to 1977.  The researchers discovered that corporations reproduce song themes.   
Their results imply that the type of ownership structure influences product variety.   
Ownership concentration produces homogeneity within the record industry.  
Peterson and Berger’s (1975) research illustrates that instances of ownership 
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concentration in the recording industry result in musical production redundancy.    
Conversely, the researchers discovered periods of ownership variety and concomitant 
production diversity.  Conducting a longitudinal analysis, Peterson and Berger analyzed 
popular songs between 1948 and 1973, concentrating on all compositions attaining a top 
ten position.  Peterson and Berger’s findings depicted periods of ownership 
concentration, and ownership diversity impacted product variety.  Peterson and Berger’s 
(1975) research was replicated by Rothenbuhler and Dimmick (1982); their results were 
analogous.     
Knowledge Producers and Knowledge Production:  
Media Ownership, Content and Programming 
Diversity of ideas in newspapers is also related to ownership diversity.  Lasorsa 
(1991) hypothesized that newspaper competition plays a significant role in diversity 
among public opinions.  Using data from all United States counties, Lasorsa’s (1991) 
results allowed him to generalize a relationship between diverse ownership structures of 
newspapers and diversity of public opinion to all United States newspaper companies.  
These results are similar in their implication to Busterna’s (1988) findings.  The social 
force of deregulation affects ownership concentration even in the newspaper industry.   
Proprietorship structure determines coverage diversity among newspapers.  
According to Hicks and Featherston (1977), multiple newspaper ownership by a single 
proprietor generates redundant news coverage.  The researchers conducted a content 
analysis of newspaper companies in Baton Rogue and Shreveport, La.  Baton Rogue 
represents the concentrated newspaper market, where both of the local papers are owned 
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by a sole entity; Shreveport’s local papers are separately owned.  A significant amount of 
news was repeated within Baton Rouge’s concentrated ownership structure compared to 
Shreveport’s competitive structure; therefore, their research shows that a relationship 
exists between the ownership structure of newspapers and story diversity that is not by 
chance.  The ownership concentration of newspapers and radio stations occurs not only 
through legislation, but also through litigious proceedings. 
Much of the literature suggests that competition’s absence in the radio industry 
deters heterogeneity.  This effect of social organization is not lost on some social 
theorists.     
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CHAPTER III 
THEORY 
 
 
Jacques Attali is a French economist best known for Noise: The Political 
Economy of Music (1985).  Attali’s premise is that the organization of society and music 
are connected: “Music runs parallel to human society, is structured like it, and changes 
when it does” (p. 10).  As such, it functions as a sort of mirror where continuous and 
accepted patterns in it reflect a society that is well settled in its mode of organization, 
whatever that may be.  Yet, music also provides a prophecy: “its styles and economic 
organization are ahead of the rest of society because it explores, much faster than 
material reality can, the entire range of possibilities in a given code” (p. 11).  Attali 
characterizes the prophetic aspects of music as “noise.”   
In general, music is organized noise.  As an example, consider the sound that 
someone who doesn’t know how to play piano would make compared to an accomplished 
pianist playing a piece of Beethoven’s.  The players’ sounds are similar, because they 
both play the same instrument; however, the sound of Beethoven is organized according 
to accepted codes, is regarded as music, and ceases to be heard as noise.  Notice the 
social nature of music: To play music is to organize sound according to the social code of 
what constitutes music. 
Once music has been organized, anything falling outside of that organization is 
considered “noise.”  Noise, then, expresses and gives focus to the disorganizing or social 
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change features in a society.  For example, while listeners of society’s music may have 
heard noise, punk rock musicians believed their music was an expression of frustration 
with the current social order and articulated a vision of what society could become.   
To address the effects of sound more specifically Attali contrasts Lent with 
festival, or carnival, which embraces the potential of noise of human society.  As in 
Durkheim’s (1912/1995) view of ancient rituals, Attali sees in carnival the conventions of 
society put aside.  Festival is a place and space where the human potential for 
spontaneous, unguided behaviors is explored and let loose.  If we think of Mardi Gras in 
New Orleans as a type of carnival, then we can hear the noise that Attali describes.  Lent, 
on the other hand, is ordered to the extreme.   
The Civil Rights movement of the 1960’s exemplifies the effect of both music 
and noise upon society.  Prior to the movement, racial segregation was the status quo, and 
Blacks participated in that prevailing social order.  However, Blacks utilized sound to 
organize against the racial status quo.  For instance, spirituals conjuring metaphorical 
images of Jewish social suffering at the hands of the Egyptians organized and mobilized 
Blacks to civil disobedience against racist laws.  The sounds of soul, jazz and rock altered 
how Blacks viewed their social status in the United States.  The Civil Rights Movement 
utilized noise to influence its participants.  However, without transmission of such 
sounds, the expression is lost.       
Distribution networks are important for transmitting both music and noise.  On 
the one hand, distribution networks can facilitate noise and thus social change.  In many 
instances, the Civil Rights, anti-Vietnam War and ”Hippie” movements would have 
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faltered without radio stations prepared to broadcast sound ideas that assisted in 
galvanizing each movements’ participants.  The “pirate” radio stations—from disc 
jockeys, managers, and even the owners—actively participated in delivering the new 
ideas presented in the new sound in each movement.  Distribution networks, on the other 
hand, control society’s messages by filtering noise.   
Ownership concentration within distribution networks limits sound sources, 
which decreases the opportunities for noise transmission, through what Attali describes as 
“stockpiling.”  Stockpiling, according to Attali, entails owning as many musical sources 
as possible to control the distribution networks; stockpiling sound sources can develop a 
distribution network based on repeating musical sources.  One observes the industry 
coming under corporate control and broadcasting quite conventional programming that 
impacts social organization through what audiences hear in music.  Limiting sounds by 
homogenizing formats, sending a message of similarity is how distribution networks 
control transmission of alternative ideas, or noise.  
Those who own the distribution network (e.g., radio stations) maintain the status 
quo through repeating formats among what theoretically are competing distribution 
networks.  Variety in format indicates recognition of differences and caters to distinctions 
that expose inequalities in the status quo.  Homogenized music formatting ignores 
audience differences and treats listeners as a mass market monolithic.  Distribution 
networks manufacture music representing dominant class interests, with format 
homogeneity as the consequence.   
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Format homogeneity perpetuates the societal status quo, following the “cookie 
cutter” approach where sublimating noise is utilized, since innovative music occasionally 
derives from pariah demographic constituencies that present an alternative perspective of 
society through music (e.g., jazz, rock and roll, rap being formulated by Blacks). The use 
of format homogeneity eliminates unique musical performance elements and ideas 
contrary to the status quo through repetition.  A performance’s musicianship, 
craftsmanship, labor and the distinct values of a musician’s heritage that connects the 
person to others, the things that make performances unique, are lost through format 
homogeneity.  Recording and mass production provide the means for other musicians to 
duplicate the original performer.3  The ability to copy a musician’s unique style, to 
reproduce a single performance, transmits through music the organizing message of 
similarity.  The consequence of ownership concentration is that a rigid social system 
occurs because radio and music convey ideas that support a hierarchy.  A repetitive 
distribution network allows ownership concentration to prohibit transmission of 
subversive views of the social world.  Ownership concentration solidifies social hierarchy 
by controlling information, which is a means of acquiring power (Smythe, 1982).  
Therefore, Attali’s theory provides some explanation to my hypothesized relationship 
between ownership concentration and format homogeneity.   
                                                 
3 The originator of jazz, Buddy Bolden, did not accept a recording contract, fearing the repetition of his 
unique musicianship by others.   
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
 
My research is explanatory, because I want to understand what appears to be a 
dearth of musical genres broadcast among radio stations; my research aspires to explicate 
the presence of redundant programming in the radio industry.  My research question is, 
what causes format homogeneity in the radio industry?   
Research Design 
My population of interest is all commercial radio stations in the Greensboro, High 
Point and Winston-Salem (Triad), North Carolina area.  I collected and analyzed data on 
ownership concentration and format homogeneity among radio stations in this market 
over a nine year period: 1994 through 2002.  This period is important because in 1996 the 
United States Congress initiated regulation reform with the Telecommunications Act, 
which seems to have concentrated radio station ownership.  My first hypothesis is that 
both radio industry ownership concentration and format homogeneity will be higher after 
1996 than from 1994 through 1996.  My second hypothesis is that as ownership 
concentration increases, format homogeneity will also increase, regardless of year. 
I obtained my data from The Gale Directory of Publications and Broadcast 
Media.  The Gale Directory contains information on newspapers, television and radio 
stations, identifying them by location, format, commercial or noncommercial status, 
frequency strength, station address, and proprietor.  The publication lists radio stations by 
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state.  Because Greensboro, High Point and Winston Salem comprise the “Piedmont 
Triad” market, all radio stations located in those three cities are included in my 
population.  I coded data for all of the Triad radio stations; my database includes year, 
radio station call letters, station’s musical format, station’s owner and city of operation.   
Because some of these data were not available from The Gale Directory, I visited 
radio station websites to acquire any missing information and also to verify information.  
I drew a systematic random sample of ten radio stations.4  The confirmatory information 
came from the website www. fcc.com and keyword searches of the radio station 
identification symbols (i.e., call letters). 
Definition of Terms and Operationalization of Variables 
For the purpose of my research, I define a radio station as a privately owned and 
operated audio transmission facility approved by the United States government.  
Ownership concentration and year of broadcast operation are my independent variables, 
while format homogeneity is my dependent variable.   
I define ownership concentration as occurring when a few proprietors possess 
most of the privately owned and operated audio transmission facilities in the Triad 
economic market.  I operationalize ownership concentration by dividing the number of 
radio station owners by the total number of radio stations, subtracted from one; therefore, 
a concentration ratio of “1” indicates the highest concentration (i.e., all radio stations are 
                                                 
4 My reliability analysis revealed only one discrepancy in the data from the three sources: Entercom 
Broadcasting acquired WKSI (Greensboro) in 2001; my original data source listed Dick Broadcasting as its 
owner. 
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owned by a single proprietor), and a value of “0” indicates the lowest concentration (i.e., 
every station has a different owner).   
I define a format as content transmitted from privately owned and operated, 
governmentally-approved radio facilities (e.g., news, talk, top 40, jazz, classical, rock, 
urban contemporary).  Commercial radio stations in the Triad market typically broadcast 
specific formats (while non-commercial stations disseminate mostly various musical 
genres).  I operationalize format homogeneity by dividing the number of formats by the 
total number of radio stations in the Triad market, subtracted from one.  In other words, a 
value of “1” indicates perfect format homogeneity (i.e., all stations broadcast a single 
format) and a value of “0” indicates perfect format heterogeneity (i.e., each station 
broadcasts a different format).   
Year of broadcast operation is an additional independent variable.  It is coded into 
pre- and post-legislation categories for part of the analysis.  
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CHAPTER V 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 
Results 
From 1994 to 2002, there were increasingly fewer radio station owners than 
stations (Figure 1) and more homogeneous formats (Figure 2).  Also, format homogeneity 
increased with ownership concentration over time (Figure 3), implying a tendency toward 
general proprietor consolidation and repetitious programming selection.   
To address my first hypothesis, I compared the mean ratios of ownership 
concentration and format homogeneity between the period from 1994 to 1996 and the one 
from 1997 to 2002.  Both ownership concentration and format homogeneity increased 
(Table 1).  These increases in ownership concentration and format homogeneity after 
1996 support my first hypothesis  
To address my second hypothesis, I performed a linear regression analysis, a 
statistical procedure that allows a researcher to determine correlation between ratio 
variables, such as ownership concentration and format homogeneity.  I regressed format 
homogeneity on ownership concentration to determine whether increases in format 
homogeneity were associated with increases in ownership concentration.   
As ownership concentration increased, so did format homogeneity.  Both 
ownership concentration and year combined relate strongly to format homogeneity; 
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ownership concentration and year of broadcast together explain 77% of the linear 
variation in format homogeneity (R2 =.77).   
Additionally, I entered year into the model to determine whether passage of the 
1996 Telecommunications Act explained some variation in format homogeneity.  I 
wanted to see if format homogeneity can be attributed more to ownership concentration 
or legislation.  Results show that ownership concentration had a greater influence on 
format homogeneity than did the 1996 Telecommunications Act; standardized regression 
coefficients (betas) indicate that ownership concentration (1.3) had a stronger impact than 
time (-.53) on format homogeneity.   
According to these coefficients, as time marched on, however, format 
homogeneity decreased holding constant for ownership concentration.5  One explanation 
for this negative coefficient, which contradicts a previous finding and one of my 
hypotheses, could be that my research analyzed ownership concentration and format 
homogeneity for a period of only eight years.  Glasser (1984) described one case of 
deregulation that occurred prior to 1994.  Having earlier data points for format 
homogeneity may have impacted the coefficient to make it a more valid measure and 
relate positively to format homogeneity.  Despite this, higher levels of format 
homogeneity were associated with higher levels of ownership concentration, on average.  
Formats were more homogeneous after the 1996 Telecommunications Act, on average.  
 
 
                                                 
5 Tests of statistical significance could not be conducted because of an unacceptable level of collinearity 
between year and ownership concentration. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
My research indicating that ownership concentration influences format 
homogeneity confirms research in the literature.  Based on what Chambers (2003a) 
discovered, ownership concentration reduces competition when corporations acquire 
independently owned facilities.  My research showed that Triad radio stations are 
susceptible to the corporate presence based on fewer owners in the market (Rogers & 
Woodbury, 1996); with fewer local voices in the market, redundancy followed 
(Chambers, 2003b).  Diverse programming is replaced with redundant formats (Table 3).    
Because media convey information, media owners are knowledge producers.  
When only a few individuals or corporations own the primary means of knowledge 
production, they filter what information is disseminated to the masses (Lasorsa1991); this 
is especially dangerous when the means for communication, such as radio stations, are so 
concentrated in their ownership.  Because innovative music is outside the perimeter of 
current radio formats, audiences will continue to redundantly receive mainstream ideas 
about society.  Promoting social change through music will continue to be a difficult task, 
because ownership concentration has raised the monetary value of owning a station so 
much that independent ownership is extremely complicated.  The independent owners are 
more likely to broadcast music perceived as ‘esoteric,’ thus making social change very 
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difficult in an era of ownership concentration (Copps, 2003).  So there is something 
greater to ownership than increasing revenue.  Control of music is powerful.   
Ownership concentration manipulates knowledge by filtering which ideas are 
disseminated.  When radio station proprietors decide against broadcasting “noise,” they 
act as knowledge gatekeepers.  They have the ability to determine what ideas audiences 
hear.  Whenever music that presents an alternative view of society is omitted, social 
knowledge gets distorted (Busterna, 1988).  New ideas are prevented from being 
disseminated because the distribution network is controlled by a few proprietors.  The 
association between ownership concentration and format homogeneity (Figure 3) 
illustrates the willingness of the few station owners to engage in wielding the power of 
filtering knowledge by repeating formats.     
Owners broadcast homogenized sounds to maintain the status quo, but it is a 
broadcast of restrained knowledge.  Pseudo-collusion occurs in the radio industry due to 
format homogeneity.  The collusion is unintentional, but the degree of format 
homogeneity in the industry has the effect of manipulating/distorting and even hoarding 
social knowledge.  The redundancy of radio programming could be construed as 
collusion (Wallis & Malm, 1993 and Breland, 1990).  According to my results, the 
contemporary regulatory climate encourages ownership concentration and format 
homogeneity in radio broadcasting.   
My analysis illustrates trends toward greater ownership concentration and format 
homogeneity in the radio industry.  With a greater emphasis on syndication that resulted 
from ownership concentration, I predict that radio will assume a more monolithic voice.    
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My data suggest a trend toward, at best, of a few formats repeated among radio stations, 
and at worst, a small number of syndicated programs throughout the industry.  
Nevertheless, my results lead me to speculate that regulation and policy may not 
ultimately matter; therefore, the radio industry may possibly go the way of a monopoly 
(Leeper, 2000).  Therefore, the future of the radio industry may be that The Song Remains 
The Same.   
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FIGURE 1 
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FIGURE 2  
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FIGURE 3 
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TABLE 1 
 
 
Mean Ownership Concentration and Format Homogeneity Ratios by Year 
  
    Ownership Concentration*           Format Homogeneity* 
     1994-1996   M =.27  SD =.01                    M =.27  SD =.04 
     1997-2002   M =.50  SD =.08                    M =.34  SD =.04 
 
*p<.10 
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TABLE 2 
 
 
Results of OLS Regression for Format Homogeneity on  
  Ownership Concentration and Year 
 
   
  
     
 Standardized 
Coefficients    t Sig. 
 Beta   
Constant  .714 .502 
Ownership 
Concentration 
1.38 1.83 .12 
Format 
Homogeneity 
-.53 -.71 .51 
R Square 
 
F 
 
  Sig. 
.76 
 
9.7  
 
.01(a) 
a  Predictors: (Constant) Year, Ownership Concentration 
 
b  Dependent Variable: Format Homogeneity 
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